Cyber security has been a growing focus within the human factors community. Over the last several years, human-centered cyber research has provided valuable insights into the cognitive and collaborative work within cyber operations, but has largely ignored how the genesis, intentions, methods and outcomes of cyber attacks impact human-related outcomes. Leveraging insights from other, more technologically focused communities, the goal of this paper is to synthesize previous work and to present a unified, descriptive framework of cyber attacks. Our framework, which consists of three dimensions, adversarial, methodological, and operational, aims to maintain the rich interactions between the components of a cyber attack while offering a further abstraction useful to future human factors research. We present each dimension in terms of the previous techno-centered research, demonstrate how the human factors community can contribute to our understanding, and ground each within the context of the StuxNet virus.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, cyber security has emerged as a critical research and development area within the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD; Maybury, 2012) . This is not surprising since the U.S. Government has experience a steady increase in the number of cyber attacks targeting its agencies and assets, e.g., from 2006-2012 U.S. federal agencies saw the number of reported cyber incidences (including malicious attacks) increase from 5,503 to 48,562 cases (Wilshusen, 2012) .
To date, research on cyber security has mostly focused on technological applications such as information fusion algorithms, network intrusion detection, digital sensor systems, and enhanced information visualizations (e.g. Ballora, Giacobe, McNeese & Hall, 2012; Jyothsna, Prasad & Prasad, 2011; Langton & Baker, 2013) . What has been less examined is the role of humans in cyber security as defense analysts, offensive cyber operators, and attack targets.
Within cyber research, there are two predominant perspectives, the operational perspective, which aims to understand and improve cyber defenses, and the attack perspective, which focuses on understanding the attacks themselves, and their impact on computing systems. At present, most human-centered cyber research has focused on the first perspective, with emphasis placed on identifying the task and cognitive requirements of (mostly defensive) cyber operators. This research has proven successful for developing conceptual models of learning, teamwork, and situation awareness for cyber operators (e.g. Champion, Rajivan, Cooke, & Jariwala, 2012; Dutt, Ahn, & Gonzalez, 2013; Giacobe, 2013; Mancuso & McNeese, 2012; Tyworth et al., 2012) .
On the other hand, there has been limited work examining cyber attacks from a human-centered perspective. Kelly et al. (2012) and Hong et al. (2013) both explored the effectiveness of phishing attacks (i.e., emails disguised to appear to be from a credible source) on swaying human decision making. Somewhat similarly, Finomore et al. (2013) and examined how cyber attacks, consisting of covert information manipulation during a computer-mediated team task, can elicit cognitive biases in team decision making. While these efforts represent an important first step in examining the impact of social engineering cyber attacks on human-decision making, they do not account for the entirety of the problem space.
Beyond that reported above, there has been little discussion within the human factors community on the role of humans as the targets of cyber attacks . Research aimed at understanding the genesis and intentions of cyber attacks, while somewhat novel to the human factors community, has been a focus in computer science and engineering research for almost 20 years. Still, while the systematic characterization and classification of cyber attacks has been identified as a critical goal for the development of cyber defense systems (Hansman & Hunt, 2005) , a comprehensive framework has yet to be established, despite a series of attempts (e.g. Bishop, 1999; Howard, 1997; Kjarland, 2005; Landwehr et al., 2004; Lough, 2001; Meyers et al., 2009; Simmons et al., 2009; van Heerden et al., 2012) .
We believe a current lack of knowledge regarding the effects of cyber attacks on human behavior and performance represents a critical research gap in cyber security research that the human factors community is particularly well suited to address. Based on this, the purpose of this paper is to identify ways in which the human factors community might contribute to cyber attack research and cyber security technology development. We accomplish this by laying out a conceptual framework (grounded using the real-world exemplar of the StuxNet attack) for human factors researchers and practitioners to help organize, identify deficits, and guide our community's future contributions in this domain.
A HUMAN-CENTERED FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER ATTACKS
During our literature review of previous cyber attack taxonomies, we found that while each proposed framework was unique, five consistent dimensions became apparent: the goal of the attack, the source of the attack, the target, the attack vector and the impact (Table 1) . The central focus of each of the frameworks and dimensions listed in the table above were purely technological, with little consideration of the human element (as attackers, defenders, targets, etc.). This is troublesome, as a primary goal of many cyber attacks is to negatively affect individual (or organizational) human behavior, decision-making, and performance -either as the specific target of an attack or as collateral damage (U.S. Joint Staff, 2006) . Furthermore, some literature suggests that many of the outcomes of a cyber attack can transcend beyond the technological space to human operators (Bilge & Dumitras, 2012; Rowe, 2006) .
To rectify this, we have attempted to identify and consolidate the salient dimensions of cyber attacks from a human-centered perspective. In so doing, we settled on a linear transaction framework model consisting of three higherorder dimensions (adversarial, methodological, and operational) that each encompass a set of supporting properties ( Figure 1 ). This framework, presented as a waterfall model, aims to preserve the rich interactions across the different dimensions, while emphasizing areas for future human factors exploration and research.
In the following sections, we will present each of the three proposed dimensions by examining previous research and discussing how the human factors community might contribute to our understanding of each. Additionally, in considering each dimension we provide an example of how this categorization scheme could be applied to assist our understanding of cyber attacks using the example of the StuxNet virus.
Adversarial
Overview. The adversarial dimension encompasses information about who the attack perpetrator is (the source), and what they hope to accomplish (the goal). Previous research considers the source of an attack to refer to an attacker's affiliation (Kjaerland, 2005) , but also their classification (e.g., hackers, vandals, spies; Kjaerland, 2005) , skill (Howard, 1997) , and level of maliciousness (Meyers, Powers, & Faissol, 2009) .
The goal of a cyber attack might be broadly defined, such as general political gain, financial gain, or damage to a computer system or physical infrastructure (Howard, 1997) , or more narrowly described, such as system damage/alteration (Howard, 1997) , or information operations (Howard, 1997; Kjarland, 2005; Simmons et al. 2009; van Heerden et al., 2012) .
The source and the goals of the attack are combined in our model because these constructs are often difficult to consider independently in practice. For example, if the attacker is identified as highly malicious, they are more likely (though not always) to have a malicious goal, and vice versa, an attack with a very malicious goal will, more often than not, come from a malicious source. By combining these two dimensions, we can construct a more representative picture of the initiator of a cyber attack, which accounts for who they are, their skills, maliciousness, and goals for an attack.
Human Factors Considerations. As previously mentioned, computer scientists and engineers have largely neglected to consider that negatively influencing human performance and decision making can be a focal goal (or secondary consequence) of a cyber attack. In fact, the DoD itself has acknowledged this perspective (U.S. Joint Staff, 2006) and classified five specific "categories" of attack (i.e., degrade, deceive, deny, destroy and disrupt; sometimes referred to as the "D5") designed to negatively affect human decisionmaking and performance. However, as we have noted, assessment and understanding of these attack goals on human and/or organizational performance is virtually unaccounted for in current research.
Performance degradation during human-computer interaction tasks is not a novel concept within the human factors community. Prior research addressing interface disruptions (e.g., Iqbal & Horvitz, 2007) , operator overload (e.g., Hancock & Szalma, 2003) , and situation awareness in automated systems (e.g. Parasuraman, Sheridan & Wickens, 2000) , provides some insight into the potential effects of cyber attacks designed to degrade human performance. Using previous research as a theoretical lens, human factors practitioners may be able to uncover other goals of cyber attacks that may not be readily apparent to the technological community, such as increased cognitive workload, affective changes, and altered mental models, to name a few.
Example from StuxNet. Based on its sophistication (Keizer, 2010) , we can assume that whoever is responsible for StuxNet possessed a high level of expertise (cf. Howard, 1997) . Drawing on the hierarchical organization described by Meyers et al. (2009) , we can assume that their skill level was "very high," indicating they were most likely black hat/professional hackers, cyber terrorists, or government actors. Using this supposition of source, and assessment of the virus itself, it is likely that the goal of StuxNet was to cause physical damage to Iranian centrifuges and accompanying computer systems (cf. Howard, 1997) . The overall goal of the virus was to first distort system level files, and ultimately disrupt the performance of the computer system. From a human factors perspective, the ultimate goals of the attack may have been deeper than simply affecting computer systems. Researchers have suggested that while it had other sub-goals, the overarching goal of the attack was to degrade performance of the Iranian Nuclear Enrichment program (Langer, 2011; Melman, 2010) . Utilizing the D5 attack characterization, the proximal goal of the attack was to damage computing infrastructure, but the distal goal was to cause a disruption in the work of plant employees that would ultimately lead to a slowdown in production of enriched uranium.
Methodological
Overview. To some extent, a cyber attack's source and goals will influence the methods employed. Within the methodological dimension, we can extract information on the target of the attack and its vector. The target can be considered at a very high level, such as the targeted organization type (Kjaerland, 2005 ), or at a lower level such as the specific process within the computing system or network (Bishop, 1999 Hansman & Hunt, 2005) . The attack vector, on the other hand, considers the path by which the attack is carried out (Howard, 1997; Kjarland, 2005; Simmons et al., 2009) , and the ultimate payload of the attack (e.g., malware; Howard, 1997; Landwehr et al., 2004; Lough, 2001; Meyers et al., 2009; Simmons et al., 2009) .
The binding links between these two dimensions are vulnerabilities. Each target has an inherent set of vulnerabilities, and as a compliment, each vector is suited to exploit a different set of vulnerabilities (Hansman & Hunt, 2005 , Howard, 1997 Kjarland, 2005) . For example, if a system has ports open to the outside internet (such as TCP Port 80, the most commonly used port for Hypertext Transfer Protocols), it would be susceptible to a denial of service attack; systems with no open ports require other vectors that utilize internal networks, so an attack such as a worm might be appropriate. When separate, vulnerabilities are not adequately represented in a system -by combining them in our consolidated framework, we can better represent how the vulnerabilities affect methodological choices in a cyber attack.
Human Factors Considerations.
Within the human factors community, there has been limited research on specific vectors that may deliver cyber effects. To date, most of this research has been focused on social engineering tactics (e.g. Kelly et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2013) , and information operations Mancuso et al., 2013) , but these represent a small sample of possible vectors that could affect humans.
Potentially relevant human factors research has shown that users can experience increased frustration and workload, and make incorrect decisions when distracted by pop-ups (Bahr & Ford, 2011) , or system lags (Scheirer, Fernandez, Klein & Picard, 2002) , for example, but we have limited knowledge of what targets would enable these effects and how they would be operationalized as vectors.
Example from StuxNet. The primary targets of the StuxNet virus were the Iranian Nuclear Centrifuge Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems (cf. Kjarland, 2005) . More specifically, the attack targeted system memory (cf. Bishiop, 1999; Simmons et al., 2009 ) and modified the operations of the connected infrastructure based on predefined criteria (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011) . Since the main target of the StuxNet worm was a SCADA machine, which often is not linked to outside networks, it had to utilize multiple vectors to attack and spread across networks (Chen, 2011) . To infiltrate those networks, StuxNet's designers exploited vulnerabilities external to the system, using tactics such as distributing free USB drives infected with the virus and other social engineering tactics (cf. Simmons et al., 2009) . Once placed on the network, StuxNet operated as an autonomous agent worm (cf. Howard, 1997; Kjarland, 2005) to spread to other systems, and installed rootkits to hide the payload malware on the system. However, the worm itself spread far beyond the SCADA systems, infecting thousands of PC workstations across the world. As discussed, a main goal of the worm was to degrade the overall performance of the Iranian nuclear program; therefore, there may be other human-centered vectors at play. For example, part of the Windows infection of the worm allowed remote servers to modify or upload new information to the infected machines (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011) . This vector potentially enabled the virus designers to distort information and degrade decision making of the users on an infected computer. Additionally, the software installed on the SCADA systems distorted information so that the system appeared to be functioning correctly. This seemingly technological outcome also had the human-centered effect of distorting human situation awareness regarding the current state of the system.
Operational
Overview. Finally, the operational dimension addresses the overall impact of the attack. Within this dimension, much of the research has focused on the impact of the attack on the computing system, whether at a network or hardware level (Bishop, 1999 ), or at the information level, such as corruption, disclosure, theft, or compromise of information (Howard, 1997; Simmons et al., 2009) . Additionally, the impact may take the form of another attack vector, as is the case with a nested attack, such as a Trojan horse virus that implants a worm on the network (Hansman & Hunt, 1997) . This dimension is essentially the outcome of the attack, i.e., did the employed attack vector and target yield a result matched to the intended goal.
Human Factors Considerations.
Of all the dimensions discussed, the operational dimension may be the most important, but has the least tangible work associated with it. The overall role of this dimension should be to metricate the impact of the attack on the entirety of the system. For a metric like this to be of use, it would have to provide a measurable indicator of what was affected at a quantitative level. However, much of the current work in this area has been purely qualitative. We believe this is an opportunity for human factors practitioners to address an important gap -as a community we are especially good at designing, validating, and deploying measurement tools to assess performance and relevant mediators. At a high level, work on organizational effectiveness, and at a lower level, metrics of stress, workload, situation awareness, and affect, may be useful in the metrication of the human-centered outcomes of cyber attacks.
Taking this perspective, it is important to note that human factors itself can be especially beneficial in expanding the scope of the operational dimension. In this case, the human factors community can add to our understanding by incorporating human-centered and socio-organizational outcomes, teasing them apart from the technological outcomes (Figure 2 ). Previous research considering the outcome of cyber attacks has been limited and mainly focused on decision making outcomes, rather than on more sensitive effects that may be longitudinal (e.g. Finomore et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2013; Kelly et al., 2012; Mancuso et al., 2013) . As new types of attacks emerge, and with the constant threat of traditional cyber attacks looming, future research must aim to understand the full scope of operational outcomes across technological, human-centered, and socio-organizational variables. Within this dimension, researchers can leverage previous work in human factors to identify key variables of interest to be isolated and tested against manipulations of the other dimensions presented in this review.
Example from StuxNet. Using this expansion to the framework, with regard to the StuxNet attack there has been little consideration of outcomes outside of the technological impact. Anecdotally, there has been discussion of the goal of degrading performance at an organizational level (i.e. Melman, 2010) , but very little information is available on specific outcomes. Additionally, this degradation in performance ties directly to the overall technological impact, but there may have been other longitudinal effects across individuals and the larger organization. For example, following the discovery of the virus, at an individual and organizational level, was there degradation in computational processing, did operators lose trust in the technology/automation, and were there changes in how operators shared information across the network? The answer to each of these questions could be useful in better understanding the full operational impact of this attack.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an overview of previous work on categorizing cyber attacks and organized it into a unified framework consisting of adversarial, methodological, and operational dimensions. The purpose of our proposed framework was twofold: 1) to maintain the richness of the previous work in describing cyber attacks while making it more accessible for human factors researchers, and 2) to identify gaps in the existing literature that human factors researchers could address. Overall, the main research question we believe interested researchers should aim to address is "what are the human-centered outcomes of cyber attacks?" Future research should focus on isolating and manipulating different aspects of the adversarial and methodological dimensions to study how they affect variables of interest in the operational dimension.
